Policy challenges for cancer research: a call to arms by Sullivan, R
Policy challenges for cancer research: a call to arms 
R Sullivan
Chairman, European Cancer Research Managers Forum and Director, Clinical Centres Cancer Research UK 
Abstract 
Research has delivered remarkable benefits for cancer patients and their families since James Watson and Francis Crick wrote the now 
immortal line, ‘We wish to propose a structure for the salt of deoxyribonucleic acid’ thus setting the molecular foundations for the 
modern era of cancer control. The pace of technological innovation from fundamental scientific discoveries to the policy impact of huge 
population studies has been breathtaking. One has only to contrast a paper on the treatment of solid epithelial cancers written by Henri 
Tagnon and colleagues in 1966 (Eur J Cancer 2 51–7) with the myriad of chemotherapeutic approaches at the oncologists disposal 
today. Inevitably, as the tide of research has risen so it has bought the flotsam and jetsam of regulations and policies. Some have been 
helpful, many pointless and too many actually harmful. Naturally, some of these regulatory and general policies (by this I mean those 
concerned with funding, structure and organization) have been specifically targeted at cancer research, e.g. US National Cancer Act 
1971, whilst others have been a product of the general regulatory environment with indirect consequences for cancer research, e.g. EU 
Data Protection Directive 1995. Policy issues thus cover a vast terrain criss-crossed by complex interdependencies between scientific 
areas, countries S&T policies and socio-political constructs. Unfortunately, there has been little attention paid to the consequences of 
these policy issues from which the research community has, by and large, been passenger rather than driver. 
Global investment in cancer research is now at unprecedented levels. The recently published report by the European Cancer Research 
Managers Forum has found some 14 billion euros being annually spent worldwide on cancer research (this figure includes industry but 
overall probably underestimates spend by at least one billion [2]). With the ageing demographics of developed countries and the catch-up 
effect in developing countries, the rising burden of cancer is driving research activity in cancer ever upwards. Opportunities for delivering 
even greater measures for preventing and controlling cancer abound, but the shackles of bureaucracy (stifling regulations and poor 
research policies) threaten this future more than ever—‘Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains’. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's 
quote could equally be applied to spirit of research creativity in today's environment. So what are the main issues and what is to be 
done?
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Figure 1: The Tower of Babel by Pieter Brueghel the Elder (1563). 
Tower of Babel 
The story of the Tower of Babel (probably derived from the 
ancient Sumerian myths around their great towers, or ziggurats) 
is well known (Figure 1). Divine intervention shattered 
humanities single language into a multiplicity of tongues, thus 
sowing confusion (balal is the Hebrew word 'to confuse'). To 
describe the structural and advocacy constructs in Europe and 
the United States as 'Towers of Babel' underestimate the scale 
of the problem. There is little interest in cancer-research 
policymaking circles about questions of dependence and 
interdependence, asymmetrical relations amongst funders and 
countries, centre-periphery relations or indeed in research 
imperialism. And yet considering the scale of cancer research 
activity, investment and the socio-political prominence that it 
enjoys such questions must be addressed. Without this 
understanding it is seriously questionable whether any major 
funder, country or representational body can honestly construct 
a strategy that has external validity. 
Funding for cancer research remains buoyant in overall terms 
but serious questions remain about the structures through which 
this funding flows. At the European level, research policy has 
been expressed since 1983 through five-year 'framework 
programmes'. Disease-specific research has had to stand in line 
with the broader European goals. Whether this is actually the 
right thing to do as a matter of principle is a matter of fierce 
debate [3] but what is clear is that, as with all politically centred 
strategies, long-term planning and commitment has not been 
Europe's forte, to the detriment of cancer research whose 
programmes of research and deliverables stretch well beyond 
political life cycles. The failure to commit to Europe against 
cancer and the network of cancer registries are just two such 
examples. 
The creation of the European Research Area and the ‘3% 
objective’ heralded change with increased emphasis on really 
adding European value and networking existing Member State 
Research Programmes [4]. In the end, however, the bottom line 
prevailed and instead of supporting the broad church of 
research, it has instead overwhelmingly concentrated on areas 
with perceived high industrial value. Perhaps no surprise given 
the overt political objectives of the Union, but this misses the 
bulk of cancer research that has high societal value. It remains 
to be seen whether the Seventh Framework Programme will be 
more holistic. The confusion of policy messages emanating 
from Brussels suggests the battle lines are still being drawn 
although the latest perspective on the European Research Area 
suggests a move to long-term planning and funding [5]. There is 
little doubt that after the fiasco of the Article 169 joint-funding 
initiative (European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials 
Partnership) [6], the Commission and Council remain wary of 
complex, disease-hypothecated programmes. Despite this, 
funds have been delivered for the Innovative Medicines 
Initiative, although this is again directed at a narrow area of 
cancer research (new chemical entities, biomarkers, etc) and 



















focused on commercial utility. Applications going forward to the 
first round of FP7 funding from cancer registries and paediatric 
oncology (Innovative Therapies for Children with Cancer—ITCC 
Consortium) will be the real acid test of a policy shift. There is 
little doubt that Europe is committed to adding value and 
networking, at least in principle, but the practicalities of putting 
this into effect within the Byzantine forum of European 
policymaking are somewhat daunting. Europe is not alone in 
this respect. In the United States, the Bayh-Dole Act 1980 
provided the ultimate experiment in how public institutions could 
manage public assets as private goods. Almost everyone is now 
in agreement that the Act, whilst certainly being fiscally 
beneficial, caused the public benefit of sharing and accessing 
Intellectual Property to be overridden by private interests to the 
detriment of research [7]. Examples of this type of misalignment 
abound in Europe and the United States, products as they are 
of confused policymaking between separate Directorates or 
Divisions prosecuting their own agendas with little regard to any 
coherent integrated strategy. Whilst attempts have been made 
since the mid-nineties to bring together major cancer policy 
groups in the United States, for example through the National 
Cancer Policy Board (then Forum from 2005) [8], Europe 
remains a mass of Member State and representational groups. 
The structural and organizational issues around cancer 
research policy stretch deeper into individual Member States 
and representational groups. Following Charles de Gaulle's 
maxim that ‘politics is too serious a matter to be left to 
politicians’, Europe has a vast array of policy active bodies 
agitating along a broad, but often conflicting and overlapping, 
front for research and cancer control programmes [9]. There are 
European bodies that claim to speak for patients, domains of 
research (e.g. imaging) and professional specialities within 
cancer. If you then add in the multiple voices at Member State 
level, particularly the charities, then you truly have a Tower of 
Babel. No wonder then, with so many voices claiming the high 
moral ground, confusion reigns even in the most sympathetic 
high political circles. To a certain extent, competition is good 
even in policymaking and the advocacy arena; there is much 
ground to cover and no one has the monopoly on the ultimate 
vision to defeat cancer. However, if such diversification 
continues and more political schisms open up between 
representational bodies, the impact and influence of this 
community on the socio-political process for allocating funds will 
be seriously diminished over the next decade. Cancer is not the 
only healthcare issue; research and progress around correcting 
the 10/90 gap is rapidly becoming the dominant health and 
disease priority [10]. Member States have also, by and large, 
not grasped the need to adequately fund cancer research in 
their country and/or create a coordinated environment that can 
at least bring the multiple funders of cancer research into that 
Member State (exceptions to this are France through L'INCA 
and the UK's NCRI). The ECRM survey has found that 
throughout Europe the individual policies of Member States 
have led to very low funding allocations for cancer research in 
many countries. This skews mobility (many countries lose their 
most valuable investigators), and encourages subsidy-seeking 
behaviour of the research community in Member States either 
from industry (thereby only prosecuting a narrow research area) 
and/or EU funding (thereby reducing the value-adding aspect of 
this funding source). Confused S&T polices at Member State 
level, which de-prioritize cancer research, need to be addressed 
urgently if a broader European vision is to be realized. 
Networks, centres, institutes: organizational policies 
for cancer research 
The organizational structures within which cancer research is 
conducted are products of the prevailing socio-political policies 
and healthcare/university systems. How a research community 
is framed can have dramatic effects on the productivity, focus 
and overall impact. Because of the breadth of cancer research 
nearly all organizational models been applied in some fashion 
over the last 50 years. Indeed views on the best way to 
organize cancer research are as varied as the stars in the sky! 
One of the most interesting observations as one listens to 
debates in this policy area is how much, as John Stuart Mills 
would put it, 'the othersideness' of human nature comes 
through. Rational, evidence-based discussion and constructs 
are the exception. Perhaps this is to be expected when one 
considers this is a fundamental social construct; however, much 
more high-quality intelligence needs to percolate into this arena. 
European structures have been dominated either by the 
historical nature of individual Member States approach to 
cancer research funding or have fallen in line with the political 
aims of the European Union. European cancer research 
structures have been dominated by the emphasis in the 
framework programmes on networks of excellence and 
integrated projects. Lately, this has focused almost wholly on 
public–private partnerships (e.g. IMI). 'The European Paradox' 
[11] (which refers to the fact that Europe plays a leading world 
role in terms of scientific excellence, but largely fails to convert 
science-based findings and inventions into wealth-generating 
innovations) remains a potent driver to these structural polices 
at European level, despite the fact that this approach essentially 
cuts out a great deal of research that, whilst of great utility to 
society, has little commercial value. This policy of networking 
has not been the rampant success that was originally 
envisaged. Indeed, the research communities soon found ways 



















of creating superficial networks to access framework funding 
when, in reality, there was little depth to the research 
relationships. On the other hand, domains of research that 
really were networked and/or absolutely required trans-national 
networking in order to conduct the research in the first place 
(e.g. large-scale clinical trials [12], particularly in orphan areas 
and population studies, including infrastructure support) went 
largely ignored. However, good programmes were funded and 
the Commission retort to this could easily point the finger at the 
Council of Ministers and European Parliament for cutting the 
framework budgets so heavily as to strangle certain promising 
structural initiatives at birth. 
One structural area that has gathered momentum in Europe 
focuses on the concept of coordination (essentially this is a 
more proactive form of programmatic networking). In 2001 two 
initiatives to create a 'virtual European Cancer Institute' were 
started—one under the auspices of a group led by Prof. Thiery 
Philip (France, CR Leon-Berard) [13], and the other by Profs. 
Fritz Schroder and Bob Pinedo (a joint FECS-ECRI 
Programme). Both camps gathered pace and by the end of 
2001 both camps were lobbying heavily to have their respective 
visions funded, at least in a pilot phase under framework 6. 
These activities led in the following February (2002) to a 
Commission-sponsored conference, Towards Greater 
Coherence in Cancer Research, out of which the ECRM was 
started. It soon became abundantly clear that all players had 
overestimated the funding that might be available and 
underestimated the political inertia that had to be overcome to 
gain any sort of momentum behind such an ambitious plan. 
Thus by the end of February, there were the first indications that 
the time for such ambition was probably not right. From 2002 to 
2005, the ECRM continued its modest activities and various 
ERA-NET (European Research Area Network) grants were 
awarded in cancer, e.g. CoCANCPG (clinical practice 
guidelines), although the one ERA-NET that could have 
improved coordination—a proposal to provide an accurate and 
comprehensive coding and database of all Member State 
cancer research—was turned down on the grounds of not being 
exciting enough! 
In 2005, a proposal led by Prof. Peter Boyle to review areas for 
greater coordination (EUROCAN +) was funded. This initiative 
will report soon and is likely to conclude that the case for a 
European Cancer Institute (virtual or otherwise) is still strong. In 
parallel, a variety of different trans European groups are 
prosecuting their own strategies—from the EORTC's Network of 
Core Institutions to the OECI's open letter to the Commission 
offering to further develop the accreditation for European 
Comprehensive Cancer Centres. Whilst the hybrid approach 
(centres and networks) is probably the way to go, the multiplicity 
of participating individuals and groups in these processes poses 
exactly the same issues faced by the early pioneers for better 
cancer research organization across Europe. Furthermore, 
there are some fundamental organizational defects at Member 
State level that could mean that any ECI is built on foundations 
of sand. Furthermore, Europe simply does not yet have 
sufficient understanding of the different models of cancer 
centres, which have been built up in each Member State; 
indeed, data that the ECRM will publish next year on EU and 
US centres indicate a huge heterogeneity in terms of size, 
productivity, research strengths and cultural paradigms. Unlike 
the US model where a top-down strategy has been in process 
since 1971 thus creating a structurally homogenous (but still 
complex) organization, that of Centres Europe has grown 
organically from the bottom up which makes any top-down 
changes hugely difficult to implement. The question also needs 
to be asked as to whether such structural radicalism is actually 
needed in Europe. There is a strong case that the US one-
structure-fits-all approach has actually reduced overall 
creativity. Europe may be messy but in terms of cancer 
research it still works. Fundamentally, the principle players have 
yet to articulate what the benefits of such an approach will be 
and how such benefits will actually be made tangible. All this 
leaves one feeling slightly dizzy as though following the hands 
drawn by Maurits Escher (Figure 2). In policy terms what is 
needed is a fixed point of reference to which one can anchor 
descriptions of cancer research structures to affirm and defend 
their validity. The structural and organizational needs of cancer 
research will be many and diverse. As Prof. Tanja Cufer has 
eloquently pointed out 'new' Europe has managed to pioneer 
some highly forward-thinking structures that provide front-line 
clinical research even in a country as small as Slovenia (where 
the population is two million strong) [14]. In the rush for new 
policies to set the next generation of cancer research centres 
and their coordination Europe needs to be far more cooperative 
from a sociological perspective, and rigorous in its analysis of 
current structures and behaviours. This perspective cannot, 
must not, be taken for granted. As Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela have observed, ‘Everything we do is a 
structural dance in the choreography of coexistence’. [15] 




















Figure 2: Maurits Cornelis Escher, Drawing Hands (1948). 
Regulating cancer research: How far before we say 
stop? 
If this all wasn't enough to worry about yet again Europe seems 
to be lurching towards another biomedical regulatory disaster 
with the proposed EU Physical Agents (EMF) Directive 
2004/40/EC that is seeking to limit exposure to a hypothetical 
threat of electromagnetic radiation. If implemented in its current 
form it would be a disaster for MRI research and the treatment 
of cancer patients. There are hopeful signs that the directive will 
be changed [16] but yet again, and despite the fiasco around 
the creation of the 'Clinical Trials' Directive, the apparatus of 
European regulatory policymaking has been found wanting. 
These latest tribulations can be added to a long list of regulatory 
policies, mostly directives that have caused nothing but trouble 
for cancer research (and indeed for all other types of 
research)—Data Protection, Clinical Trials [17], etc. Because 
these regulatory policies tend to be anthropocentric, i.e. they 
deal with matters relating to people, their tissues and medical 
data—the domains of cancer research that have been hit 
hardest—they are already those which are the most difficult to 
conduct, whilst being the most valuable in terms of direct patient 
benefit. Thus, we have the perverse situation where the 
emphasis is now on translational and clinical research, whilst at 
the same stroke the regulatory burden is exponentially 
increased. The United States and individual Member States fair 
little better. The former has seen a dramatic increase in 
regulations, e.g. HIPPA, whilst in the latter case unilateral 
action, for example in England and Wales against human 
tissues, has led to its own set of unique problems. At the heart 
of this lies a fundamental flaw in the way that risk is viewed by 
policymakers (particularly those in the EU). The concept of the 
universal precautionary principle, a product of early German 
and Swedish thinking about environmental policy (and, in light 
of Rachel Carson's Silent Springs, this certainly was the correct 
approach for the environment, that isn't under contention), 
became the core principle for managing biomedical risk. 
However, biomedical research is a very different paradigm from 
environmental issues and, as such, a precautionary approach 
leads to 'precaution without principle' and a reduction/stoppage 
of public-benefit research as costs increase (note: despite 
industry also suffering they are far more capable of passing on 
the costs to consumers). [18] 
Although the cancer research community has finally started to 
engage on these issues, the business of regulation appears to 
be an unstoppable juggernaut. Simply put, the over-regulation 



















of science is one of the single biggest threats to cancer 
research. There are no glib answers to this most dangerous of 
situations. Globalization of research means that if one continent 
or country does not do it then another will (embryonic stem cell 
research moving to Europe is a good example of this effect). In 
this situation, realism pervades (real-politic) and the situation is 
a never-ending game of control and escape. Such a situation 
though is untenable as the cost per unit research continually 
escalates without any improvement in productivity (this is 101 
economics!). Somehow, the prevailing regulatory paradigms 
must be deconstructed and challenged at every opportunity. 
Here, the research community must engage the patient 
advocacy groups to explain why this is not special pleading and 
drive home the reality of this threat. 
 
Final thoughts 
The reader will not be in the least bit surprised to learn that the 
policy issues discussed in this short article represent a fraction 
of the ongoing fun and games. For example, we have not even 
touched upon the festival of delights that is the regulatory 
environment around drugs and devices, genetics, stem cells, 
animal research, healthcare policy and its impact on research, 
etc. In this sense, cancer research policy can seem distant and 
daunting; all the more reason not to engage. However, it is the 
moral responsibility of the research community to engage and 
even more so to take control. Allowing the media and illiterate 
political policymakers to dictate the destiny of cancer research 
fails patients and their families. Never has there been a more 
urgent need to create a third culture [19] of direct interaction 
between the research community and public, as well as direct 
action at the policy level. 
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